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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 970232-CA

v.

GASPER BORGOGNO,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from his conviction of arranging for the distribution of a
controlled substance, a second degree felony,1 in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(ii) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e)(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Has defendant shown that the prosecutor wrongfully failed to
disclose an audiotape under due process or rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
defendant's brief incorrectly states that he was charged and convicted of
arranging for distribution of a controlled substance as a third degree felony. Brief of
Appellant [hereinafter Br. App.] at 6. Although defendant was originally charged with
third degree felony arranging for distribution, the information was amended without
objection to second degree felony arranging for distribution (R. 05, 73-74). Also, the
verdict and Judgment Sentence, and Commitment state that the subsequent conviction
was for a second degree felony (R. 50, 53).
1

where the defendant knew of the tape's existence and the prosecutor made the tape
available to defense counsel? Alternatively, is it possible for this Court to adequately
review defendant's claim of a discovery violation when the allegedly non-disclosed
audiotape is not in the record?
Standard of Review: The extent of a prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence is
determined under due process and rule 16(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and is
hence a question of law. See State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994). A
discovery violation under rule 16(a) constitutes reversible error only if there is a
reasonable likelihood that absent the error defendant would have obtained a more
favorable result. State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). Failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence under due process does not require reversal unless the nondisclosure results in the suppression of evidence that is "constitutionally material," or, in
other words, evidence that would have created a "reasonable probability of a different
result." Kvles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
Issue No. 2: Is the record adequate to permit an appellate determination that
defense counsel was ineffective for allegedly not listening to an audiotape when the
record is silent as to whether defense counsel actually listened to the tape and when the
tape is not included in the record?
Standard of Review: In the absence of an adequate record, an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim may not be raised on direct appeal, but must be addressed in a
2

collateral, post-conviction proceeding. State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah
1991); State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App. 1993).
Issue No. 3: May this Court review defendant's claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request jury voir dire regarding publicity for an alleged sevenyear-old incident involving defendant when this claim depends solely on extra-record
facts?
Standard of Review: An appellate court will not consider facts outside the record.
Pilcher v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.. 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983); Koulis v. Standard Oil
C a , 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statute and rule are applicable:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1998):
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance.
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1998):
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon
request the following material or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;

(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant
to adequately prepare his defense.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be
inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in an August 13, 1996, information with arranging for
distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony,2 in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1998) (R. 05). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was
bound over for trial (R. 12). Four months later, a jury convicted defendant as charged (R.
50). The trial court sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen years in prison and fined him
$5,000, but stayed the sentence and placed defendant on thirty-six months probation (R.
53). Defendant timely appealed his conviction (R. 59).
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3
In exchange for favorable sentencing recommendations on pending assault and
burglary charges, Joseph Grimaud4 agreed to assist the Tooele Police Department in

2

See footnote 1, supra.

3

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v.
Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996).
4

Grimaud is spelled "Girmaud" throughout the record (R. 113, 124). That appears
to be a misspelling as Mr. Grimaud himself spelled his name "Grimaud" (R. 161). The
4

making controlled buys of illegal drugs (R. 124, 126, 162-63). On a pre-arranged night,
the police attached an electronic wire to Grimaud's chest and gave him a $100 bill (R.
127, 140, 166-67). Under police surveillance, Grimaud unsuccessfully attempted a buy in
Tooele (R. 128, 141, 149). He then went to defendant's place of business in nearby
Stockton because he knew that he "could make a buy there through [defendant]" (R. 168).
Grimaud entered defendant's business and asked defendant if he had a "teener"5
(R. 132, 172, 199). Defendant replied, "No, I wish I did," but then turned to Jack
Henwood, who was also present, and asked if he had one (R. 132-33, 171-73, 177, 20002). Henwood said that he did and pulled out a clear plastic baggie containing
methamphetamine (R. 176, 184, 208). Defendant then opened his desk drawer and
removed a yellow baggie, which he handed to Henwood (R. 176). After pouring some of
the methamphetamine into the yellow baggie, Henwood put it on the desk and defendant
slid the baggie over to Grimaud (R. 173, 176, 209). Grimaud gave Henwood the $100
bill (R. 173, 176).
Grimaud drove back to Tooele where he turned over the purchased drugs to police
and briefly recounted what had happened (R. 133-35, 144-45, 174, 211-12). When police
arrested Henwood about thirty minutes later, they found three yellow baggies containing
methamphetamine in his front right pocket (R. 158, 197, 201, 212).
State will use Mr. Grimaud's spelling.
5

"Teener" is slang for a 1/16 ounce of methamphetamine (R. 132).
5

Discovery Issue
Police officers listened to and tape recorded the drug transaction over a transmitter
(R. 129, 130-33, 136-37, 138, 174-75,209). After the transaction, Detective Roger
Niesporek prepared an incident report relating the substance of what he heard over the
transmitter and what Grimaud had told him afterward (R. 125, 136-37, 213).
Although the record does not contain a written or oral defense request for
discovery, the State filed a formal written "Response to Motion for Discovery (R. 10;
Addendum A). The State's response, which was filed five months before trial, listed
several documents as attachments, including three police reports (R. 07-10). The
response invited defendant to make an appointment with the prosecutor's office to view
or listen to any evidence in aural or visual form that had not yet been transcribed (R. 09).
Although the response itself did not specify the tape recording of the controlled buy,
however, defendant concedes that he was aware of the existence of the tape because it
was mentioned in one of the police reports provided by the prosecutor.6 Br. App. 7, 12.
At trial, Detective Niesporek testified that via the transmitter he heard Grimaud
ask defendant for a "teener" and defendant respond, "I wish I did" (R. 132, 136). The
detective then heard defendant ask someone else if "he had any" and that person answer

6

Defendant has included that police report in Appendix A. Because that report
does not appear in the record, the State has moved separately on this date to strike
defendant's Appendix A, as well as other portions of his brief containing and relying on
extra-record material.
6

affirmatively (R. 132, 137). Grimaud testified to essentially the same conversation, but
under cross-examination, added that defendant had given Henwood a yellow baggie to
pour the drugs into and that defendant had afterwards pushed the filled baggie across the
desk to Grimaud (R. 171-73, 176-77). Grimaud also stated that unlike other drug dealers
in town who used black or blue bags, defendant always used yellow bags (173, 175).
On rebuttal, Detective Niesporek testified that Grimaud had not previously told
him that defendant had provided Henwood with the baggie or that defendant had pushed
the drugs across the desk to Grimaud (R. 211, 212-13). However, Grimaud had told the
detective that Henwood had quite a bit more than a "teener" in his baggie, which was why
Henwood was later stopped and arrested (R. 211).
The defense called Henwood, who testified that he did not "think" defendant
opened his desk drawer or touched the baggie or the hundred dollar bill (R. 200, 203).
Henwood claimed that he already had the baggie, but he could not remember whether he
or defendant had poured any methamphetamine into the baggie that he ultimately gave to
Grimaud (R. 200, 203).
Although the tape recording of the controlled buy and Detective Niesporek's
incident report were mentioned throughout the trial, neither were offered or received into
evidence and neither appear in the record (R. 136, 137, 170, 174-75, 213). Furthermore,
nothing in the record states what police officers did with the tape or whether the tape was
ever transcribed.
7

Additional relevant facts are included in the argument sections.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendant argues that the prosecutor wrongfully failed to produce the
audiotape of the controlled buy of methamphetamine. Defendant concedes that the
State's written response to discovery disclosed the existence of the tape and invited him
to make an appointment to listen to any aural evidence, but contends that this was
inadequate under both due process and rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
According to defendant, due process and rule 16 require the prosecutor to not only
divulge the existence of exculpatory and inculpatory evidence, but also to actually
produce that evidence. According to defendant, inviting him to make an appointment to
listen to the tape was insufficient.
Defendant's position is not supported by existing authority. Rule 16(e)
specifically provides that either the prosecutor or the defendant may "make disclosure by
notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or
copied at specified reasonable times and places." That was done here. Moreover, both
due process and rule 16 presuppose that a violation occurs only when the alleged nondisclosed evidence is not known to the defense. In this case, defendant admits not only
that he knew of the audiotape, but also that the prosecutor informed him in writing how
he could arrange to listen to the tape. Accordingly, no discovery violation occurred.
In any event, defendant cannot show that any alleged non-disclosure of the tape
8

would have affected the outcome of trial because neither the tape nor its transcript
appears in the record.
Point II: Defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his trial attorney did not make a formal discovery request, file a motion to
compel production of the tape or its transcript, or make any arrangements to listen to the
tape before trial. Absent an adequate record, a defendant may not raise an ineffective
assistance counsel claim on direct appeal. In this case, the record is insufficient to review
this issue because the record is silent both as to whether or not trial counsel listened to the
tape and because the absence of the tape precludes defendant from demonstrating that he
was prejudiced by any of the alleged deficiencies of his attorney's performance.
Point III: Defendant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did
not adequately voir dire prospective jurors regarding publicity of a seven-year-old drugrelated incident involving defendant may not be reviewed by this Court because it
depends solely on extra-record facts.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A DISCOVERY
VIOLATION BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR DISCLOSED
THE EXISTENCE OF THE AUDIOTAPE AND PROVIDED A
MEANS FOR DEFENDANT TO LISTEN TO THE TAPE. IN
ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW PREJUDICE
BECAUSE THE ALLEGEDLY NON^DISCLOSED
AUDIOTAPE IS NOT IN THE RECORD.
Defendant claims that the prosecutor wrongfully failed to produce the audiotape of
the controlled buy of methamphetamine. Br. App. 11-12, 15. Defendant acknowledges
that he knew of the tape's existence before trial and that the prosecutor's written response
to discovery invited him to make an appointment to listen to any aural evidence not yet
transcribed. Br. App. 11-12, 15. He contends, however, that this response was
inadequate because the prosecutor had an absolute duty under both federal due process
and rule 16(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to either produce the tape or to
specifically state that he was not going to produce the tape. Br. App. 11-16.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's failure to produce the tape impaired his
ability to defend himself because he was surprised by Grimaud's testimony that defendant
provided Henwood with the yellow baggie and then slid the filled baggie over to
Grimaud. Br. .App. 15-24. Speculating that the tape might have shown that Grimaud
was lying about these facts, defendant concludes that had the tape been produced there
would have been a reasonable likelihood of a different verdict. Br. App. 23-24.
10

Defendant's argument erroneously assumes that the prosecutor's disclosure of the
existence of the tape and offer to make the tape available constitutes a discovery violation
under due process and rule 16(a). To the contrary, the prosecutor's response comported
with the disclosure requirements under both standards. Moreover, defendant cannot show
that any non-disclosure would have impacted the verdict because neither the tape nor its
transcript appears in the record.
A. The prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence.
The duty of a prosecutor to disclose evidence to a criminal defendant arises out of
two independent sources: the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as set
forth by Bradv v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny, and rule 16, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure. State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994); State v. Carter.
707 P.2d 656, 661-62 (Utah 1985).
1. Due Process
Due process requires prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence which is
material to guilt or punishment, even if the defendant does not request it. United States v.
Bagley. 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (explaining requirements of Brady v. Maryland. 373
U.S. 83 (1963) and United States v. Agurs. 427 U.S. 97 (1976)); see also Kallin. 877 P.2d
at 143; State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1988). Failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence under the due process clause, however, does not require reversal unless the nondisclosure results in the suppression of evidence that is "constitutionally material" in the
11

sense that its disclosure would have created a "reasonable probability of a different
result." Kvles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.
Defendant bears the burden of establishing a "reasonable probability of a different result"
by a preponderance of the evidence." Kvles. 514 U.S. at 434.
2. Rule 16. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires a prosecutor to disclose upon
request any relevant written or recorded statements by defendant, defendant's criminal
record, any physical evidence seized from defendant, and any evidence known to the
prosecutor which tends to negate or mitigate the guilt of the accused. Utah R. Crim. P.
16(a) (1-4). That rule also requires a prosecutor to divulge other relevant inculpatory
evidence when ordered by the court. KalHn, 877 P.2d at 143.
Like the materiality standard under due process, a rule 16 discovery violation
constitutes reversible error only if, after a review of the record, there is a reasonable
likelihood that but for the error there would have been a more favorable result for the
defendant. A "mere possibility" of a different outcome is not sufficient, rather "the
likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in
the verdict." State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).
B. Defendant has not shown a discovery violation.
Defendant has not shown that the prosecutor failed to make an adequate disclosure
under either Brady or rule 16. Defendant readily concedes that he knew of the existence
12

of the tape from the police report provided to him by the prosecutor. Br. App. 7, 11-12.
He also acknowledges that the prosecutor's written response invited him to make an
appointment to listen to any aural evidence not yet transcribed. Br. App. 11-12. He
simply asserts, without citing to any authority, that due process and rule 16 required more
of the prosecutor. Br. App. 12-15.
Existing authority contradicts defendant's argument. For example, subsection (e)
of rule 16 specifically provides for informal discovery and allows a prosecutor or
defendant to ''make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and
information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places."
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(e): see also Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525-26 (Utah 1994)
(acknowledging applicability of rule 16(e) to "open file" policy of prosecutors).
Defendant has not alleged, much less shown, that the prosecutor's offer to make aural
evidence available to defendant, was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.
Moreover, both due process and rule 16 presuppose that a violation occurs only
when the alleged non-disclosed information is not known to the defense. See, e.g.. Agurs,
427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 2397 (Brady applies in three different situations, all of which
involve information known to the prosecutor but unknown to the defense); State v. Jarrell.
608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980) (evidence is not improperly withheld if defense has
knowledge of that evidence and defense counsel simply fails to request it); State v.
Workman. 635 P.2d 49, 52-53 (Utah 1981) (where defendant had notice that state

13

intended to rely on witness at trial, defendant had responsibility to undertake reasonable
discovery or steps to challenge veracity of that witnesses' testimony); Kallin, 877 P.2d at
143 (prosecution has duty to make correct and complete disclosure, but defense counsel
has affirmative duty to make reasonable investigation). Here, by defendant's own
admission, he knew of the audiotape and its basic contents because of a disclosure made
to him by the prosecutor. Br. App. 7, 11-12. He also admits that he could have arranged
to listen to the tape by contacting the prosecutor's office. Under these circumstances,
defendant has not made even a colorable claim that the prosecutor wrongfully withheld
evidence under either due process or rule 16.
C. Defendant has not established that any non-disclosure would have been prejudicial.
In any event, defendant cannot show that any alleged non-disclosure of the tape
would have affected the outcome of trial under either a due process or rule 16 standard.
As noted, neither the tape nor its transcript appear in the record. Therefore, it is
impossible for this Court to evaluate whether the tape was constitutionally material or
whether its disclosure raised a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result to
defendant. The absence of the tape and its transcript from the record thus precludes
review of this claim. See Worthen. 765 P.2d at 850 (Utah 1988) (failure of defendant to
provide evidentiary basis for determining whether undisclosed evidence was exculpatory
left court unable to resolve issue of whether prosecutor was required to disclose
evidence).
14

Defendant nevertheless asserts that there is "a very strong likelihood" that the tape
was exculpatory in that it would have corroborated the testimony of the police officer and
Henwood, while negating that of Grimaud, thereby creating the likelihood of a different
result. Br. App. 24. That assertion is nothing more than conjecture and, without the tape
itself, is unsupported by the record.
Indeed, contrary to defendant's assertions, a review of the record demonstrates that
the testimony of the three witnesses was in most respects the same and that it is unlikely
that the tape would have resolved any significant conflicts in that testimony. All three
testified that Grimaud entered defendant's business and asked if defendant had a "teener"
(R. 132, 136, 171-72, 200). They all agreed that defendant responded that he did not, but
wished that he did7 (R. 132, 136, 171-72, 177, 200, 202). Both Grimaud and the officer
testified that defendant then turned to Henwood and asked if he had any (R. 132-33, 137,
177). Although Henwood stated that he did not think defendant actually asked whether
Henwood had any, he did testify that defendant "looked over at me and wanted to know if
I had any" (R. 202).
The only significant difference between Grimaud's testimony and that of the
officer and Henwood was that Grimaud stated that defendant opened a desk drawer from

7

Grimaud's testimony varied somewhat from the other two witnesses on this point
in that he did not state that defendant used the words, "I wish I did." Defendant did,
however, testify that defendant expressed the same sentiment when after stating that he
did not have a "teener," defendant said, "I'm sorry I don't" (R. 177).
15

which he supplied Henwood with a yellow baggie and that defendant thereafter pushed
the filled baggie across the desk to Grimaud. While those actions could be described by
someone who had observed them, they were not the type of actions that would
necessarily be reflected on an audiotape. Defendant posits that the tape might have
carried the sound of a drawer opening. Br. App. 22-23. If so, the tape would have
supported Grimaud's testimony rather than discredited it. Certainly, the absence of the
sound of a drawer opening would be meaningless, particularly if the recording was poor
or there was excessive background noise.
In short, without the tape, there is no way of knowing whether the evidence was
exculpatory and therefore had to be produced under Brady or rule 16, and whether there
was any prejudicial non-disclosure.
POINT II
THE RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT TO ALLOW THIS COURT
TO DETERMINE WHETHER TRIAL COUNSEL'S
PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT WITH RESPECT TO
DISCOVERY OF THE AUDIOTAPE OR, IF SO, WHETHER
ANY DEFICIENCIES PREJUDICED DEFENDANT.
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because his trial
counsel did not make a formal discovery request, file a motion to compel production of
the tape or its transcript, or make arrangements to listen to the tape. Br. App. 24-34.
Again, the record in this case is insufficient to review defendant's claim both because the
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record is silent as to whether trial counsel made a discovery request or listened to the
tape, and because the absence of the tape in the record forecloses defendant from showing
that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiencies of counsel in this regard.
To establish that he did not receive the level of representation guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment, defendant has the burden of establishing two elements. First, he must
identify the specific acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984); Parsons v.
Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994); State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 1996).
Second, he must affirmatively establish that, "but for his counsel's deficient performance,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different."
Hovater, 914 P.2d at 39 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694); see also Parsons. 871
P.2d at 522. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome/' Hovater. 914 P.2d at 39 (citations omitted). Defendant must establish
that the claimed ineffective assistance is a "demonstrable reality," and not based on mere
speculation. Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993).
Ordinarily, an ineffective assistance counsel claim cannot be raised on direct
appeal, but must be addressed in a collateral, post-conviction proceeding. State v.
Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991); State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 581 (Utah
App. 1993). This is because the trial record is often insufficient to allow an
ineffectiveness claim to be determined on appeal. Humphries. 818 P.2d at 1029; Garrett.
17

849 P.2d at 580. Nevertheless, an ineffectiveness claim may be reviewed on direct appeal
if the record is adequate to permit a decision and if the defendant is represented by new
counsel on appeal. Humphries, 818 P.2d at 1029; Garrett. 849 P.2d at 580. A trial record
is adequate only if the appellate court is not aware of any evidence or arguments which
might be made that is not before it. Garrett. 849 P.2d at 580.
Defendant argues that he has met both criteria for permitting his ineffective
assistance of claim to be reviewed on direct appeal. While it is true that appellate counsel
did not represent defendant below, defendant is incorrect in his assertion that the record is
adequate to support his allegation that trial counsel's performance was deficient or that
any alleged deficiencies prejudiced him.
. A. The record is inadequate to determine whether trial counsel performed deficiently.
Defendant alleges that his trial attorney's performance was deficient because he
did not make a formal discovery request or a follow-up motion to compel production of
the tape and because his attorney did not actually listen to the tape. Br. App. 24, 29. The
record does not support defendant's assumptions on this point.
Defendant first assumes that his attorney did not make a formal discovery request
because no request appears in the pleadings file. It is possible, however, that defendant's
attorney did serve the State with a written response, but merely failed to file that request
with the court. Indeed, the presence of the State's written response in the record strongly
suggests that defense counsel made some type of request, written or oral. Otherwise,
18

there would be no need for the State to make a written response. In any event, whether a
formal discovery request was made in this case is irrelevant because, as already stated, the
prosecutor filed a response to discovery in which the existence of the audiotape was
disclosed (Addendum A). Significantly, defendant has not alleged what information a
formal written request would have divulged that he had not already received. See
Parsons. 871 P.2d at 526 (defendant could not show his counsel was ineffective for not
making formal discovery motion where defendant did not explain what exculpatory
information such a motion would yield that "open file" policy did not).
Similarly, there was no need to move to compel production of the tape because, as
noted, the prosecutor disclosed its existence and offered to make it available for defense
counsel to listen to (Br. App. 12; Addendum A). There is no indication in the record that
the prosecutor ever refused a reasonable request by defense counsel to listen to the tape or
to obtain a copy of it. It must be assumed therefore that the tape was available to defense
counsel without an order compelling its production.
With respect to defendant's third claim of deficient performance, he again simply
assumes that his trial counsel never listened to the tape. Defendant relies on two
statements in the record to support this supposition. First, defendant at one point asked
the trial court if he had the right to listen to the recording (R. 170). The trial court
appropriately referred defendant to his counsel for a response and nothing more was said
on the matter (R. 170). Second, defense counsel asked the informant on cross19

examination if the drug buy had been recorded and if the informant knew who had
possession of the recording (R. 174-75).
Neither statement supports defendant's allegation that counsel did not listen to the
tape. The fact that defendant had not yet listened to the tape does not mean that his
attorney had not. Likewise, asking the informant about the tape and who possessed it
neither proves nor disproves that defense counsel had not heard the tape. Defense
counsel may have asked about the tape and who had possession of it because he wanted to
inform the jury of its existence and cause them to wonder why, if there was a tape, that
the prosecution did not use it. This suggestion could have then led the jury to believe that
the prosecutor was trying to hide something and that the recording would not have fully
supported the State's case.
In short, the record is simply inadequate for determining whether trial counsel
made a formal request for discovery or listened to the tape.
B. The record is insufficient to show that defendant was harmed by any alleged
deficiencies in his trial counsel's performance.
Even if defendant could show on this record that his trial counsel's performance
was deficient, he cannot meet his burden of showing that he was prejudiced. For
defendant to show prejudice, he must be able to demonstrate that the tape recording
would have discredited Grimaud's testimony regarding the baggie and defendant's part in
the transaction. As noted in Point I, it is impossible to tell whether or not the tape would
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support Grimaud's testimony because the tape is not included in the record. Defendant's
claim on this point must therefore fail.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WITH RESPECT TO THE JURY VOIR DIRE IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY RECORD FACTS.
Defendant also claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his counsel did not adequately voir dire prospective jurors regarding publicity
surrounding the defendant from a drug-related incident that occurred nearly seven years
before the trial in this matter. Br. App. 34-38. Defendant asserts that in 1990 police
officers discovered that someone was operating a "drug lab" in a building owned by
defendant in Stockton, Utah. Br. App. 35-36. Defendant alleges that the whole town of
Stockton had to be evacuated to allow law enforcement to safely remove the dangerous
chemicals used in the lab and that the resulting extensive publicity linked defendant's
name with the incident. Br. App. 35-36.
None of the facts on which defendant relies for this point can be found in the
record and therefore may not be considered by this Court. Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d
981, 983 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); State v. Hutchings. 672 P.2d 404, 405 (Utah 1983)
(per curiam); Pilcher v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.. 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983); Watkins V;
Simonds. 385 P.2d 154, 155 (Utah 1963); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182,
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1184 (Utah App. 1987). Because defendant's claim has no record support, it fails.8
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, and indeed fails because
of no record support, the State does not request that it be set for oral argument or that a
published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JF*

day of

J^

1998

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

8

The State has filed a separate motion on this date to strike this portion of
defendant's brief as well as his appendices in which he attaches two extra-record police
reports. See note 6, supra. Appendix B contains a May 1990 police report that refers to
the drug lab incident and the fact that defendant owned the building involved. Nothing in
the record, however, indicates how extensive the publicity surrounding the incident was
or even if defendant's name was publicly linked with the incident.
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prepaid, two accurate copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to WILLIAM B.
PARSONS III, Attorney for Appellant, at 440 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84115.
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ADDENDUM A
State's Response to Motion for Discovery

rlU.U

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT

96 AUG 3 0 P,l J : 5 9
ALAN K. JEPPESEN (1694)
Deputy Tooele County Attorney
Tooele County Courthouse
47 South Main Street
Tooele, Utah 84074
Telephone: (801)882-9125
I n m e T h i r d Judicial District C o u r t
i n a n d F o r T o o e l e C o u n t y , S t a t e or U t a h
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]
I
)I

RESPONSE TO MOTION
FOR DISCOVERY

Vs.
GASPER A. BORGOGNO,

i

Court No. 961000294

Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through Alan K. Jeppesen, Deputy Tooele County
Attorney, herewith responds to defendant's Formal Request for Discovery as follows:
1.

The attached documents represent all discoverable, non-privileged, reports and

witness statements, if any, in the possession of the County Attorney as of the date of the date of this
response. Other documents, notes, statements, and related materials may exist in individual police
agencyfiles.You are directed to contact these agencies for such information. The prosecution does
specifically deny any request for police officer notebook entries, officers' field notes, or documents
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of any and every kind and description in possession of or known to any police investigative agency,
prosecuting agency, or department.
2.

Physical evidence in the custody of the arresting police agency may be viewed

by contacting the appropriate evidence custodian.
3.

Unless exculpatory evidence or evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the

accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced
punishment is set forth in the attached documents, the same is unknown to the prosecutor, and the
prosecutor herewith denies the request for production of the same..
4.

The State may call any person named in the attached documents as a witness

at the time of preliminary hearing, trial or sentencing of the defendant. The testimony of said
individuals is expected to be as indicated by the reports and statements submitted in compliance with
the defendant's request for discovery, but the prosecutor makes no representations that each of said
persons will state a specific fact as therein set forth, as the same cannot be determined without the
witness being placed under oath and examined and cross examined at the time of trial.
5.

Recorded reports or evidence in aural or visual form, which has not been

transcribed at the time of this response may be viewed at the office of the prosecutor or such other

000 09

Page 3
STATE OF UTAH VS. GASPER A. BORGOGNO
Response to Motion for Discovery

place as he may designate upon an appointment being arranged between the prosecutor and the
defendant's counsel.
6.

The criminal records of the defendant, if any, are attached. If there is no such

record attached, please specifically request a copy thereof from the prosecutor.
7.

The defendant should not assume that any of the aforenamed persons will be

called as witnesses at the time of the preliminary hearing or trial, but should subpoena said person if
defendant wishes to have them testify at either of said hearings.
8.

The State does herewith deny any request for information relative to any

disciplinary action taken against any officer who may be a witness herein.
9.

There are no known oral statements made to the prosecutor by any witness

or police officer which would be favorable to the defendant unless specifically set forth in the material
supplied herewith.
10.

To the extent that it is necessary to prove a corpus delicti, in proving a prima

facie case, the State intends to do so without any statements made by the defendant The grounds
for probable cause to arrest the defendant are stated in the incident report furnished herewith
11.

The prosecutor herewith objects to all other requests of the defendant for

discovery, and denies any duty or obligation not required by court order to produce any information
requested by the defendant's Formal Request for Discovery. All such motion> must
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comply with the requirements of Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 4-102(2)( A)
of the Rules of Judicial Administration.
12.

The attached documents include the following items:
a.

Formal Information (2 pgs)

b.

No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet (1 pg)

c.

Tooele City Police Report 96-3361 (6 pgs)

d.

Investigative Report (4 pgs)

e.

Tooele City Police Report 96-3345 (2 pgs)

f.

Title Registration for Jack Henwood (1 pg)

g.

Vehicle Impound Report (1 pg)

h.

Evidence Property Tracing (1 pg)

i.

Tooele City Police Report 96-3345 (6 pes)

j.

State Crime Lab Report (2 pgs)

DATED this

day of August^ 1996.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Response to
Motion for Discovery to Scott Broadhead, Attorney for Defendant, at 250 South Main, Tooele, Utah
84074, this &

day of August, 1996.

000 0G

